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Drummond: Disposable Income Requirements under Chapter 13

DISPOSABLE INCOME REQUIREMENTS UNDER
CHAPTER 13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Robert G. Drummond"
I. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code offers unique benefits to
debtors seeking to reorganize their financial affairs and to creditors seeking repayment of all or a portion of their debts. Under
Chapter 13, debtors may retain non-exempt assets in return for
committing a portion of their future income to repay their creditors. This portion of the debtor's future income which must be
committed to repay creditors is known as disposable income. The
disposable income requirement was added to Chapter 13 by the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act (BAFJA) of
1984.' Disposable income requirements are important as a
means for creditors and Trustees to ensure that they will receive
maximum repayment when consumer debtors seek to reorganize
their financial affairs under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code.2
Creditors are becoming increasingly active in the confirmation process by looking to the disposable income requirement as
a way to oppose confirmation. Creditors and Trustees may object
to confirmation of Chapter 13 plans which appear to allow the
debtor to reorganize without committing as much income as

* B.S., Montana State University, 1980; J.D. University of Montana, 1987. Mr.
Drummond is a shareholder in the firm of Marra, Wenz, Johnson and Hopkins, P.C.,
Great Falls, Montana and is the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee for the District of
Montana.
1. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (1995), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-544,
100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.);
Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat.
610 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388; Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104
Stat. 4789; Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.); Treasury Postal
Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509,
104 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C.).
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possible to funding the plan. Creditors and Trustees are searching for means of applying new-found disposable income to payments under the plan in order to increase the amount paid on allowed claims. Trustees and creditors recognize that increasing
the scope of the disposable income requirement will result in
increased distributions to creditors.
In reorganizing under Chapter 13, debtors have employed a
variety of methods in attempting to minimize the disposable
income requirement. Debtors often seek to expand the scope of
reasonable expenses which they believe are necessary to maintain their households. Also, debtors may claim that income is
protected from the disposable income requirement because the
income is from exempt sources, or that the income is reasonably
necessary for maintenance of the debtor and his dependents.
Furthermore, debtors operating under the terms of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan may face future unanticipated changes
in their disposable income which creditors and Trustees may
seek to have committed to the creditors under the terms of a
modified plan. Debtors are seeking means to prevent being
forced to commit such unanticipated disposable income to Chapter 13 plans. In this regard, debtors may argue that the income
was not part of their "projected" disposable income and, thus, is
beyond the reach of creditors and the Trustee. In sum, the disposable income requirement under Chapter 13 is an important
factor for creditors and debtors to examine carefully, both at the
time a decision is made to file a consumer bankruptcy and
throughout the term of the consumer reorganization plan.
However, the disposable income requirement is a flexible
concept which has challenged the interpretive power of the
courts. Consequently, courts have struggled to balance the interests of creditors and debtors both in defining the disposable
income requirement and weighing exactly what expenses are
reasonable and necessary for maintenance of the debtor's household. In striking a balance between the interests of creditors and
debtors with respect to the disposable income requirement,
courts have sought to refrain from interfering with the debtor's
lifestyle while determining which expenses the debtor should be
allowed to incur.
This article examines the disposable income requirement, its
evolution, and its future in Chapter 13. Part II discusses the
evolution of the disposable income requirement through its codification under BAFJA in 1984. Part III discusses the funding of
a Chapter 13 plan and the implications of such funding for the
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/8
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disposable income requirement. Part IV examines problems in
determining the composition of disposable income. Finally, Part
V discusses a major area of controversy with respect to the disposable income requirement--determining the allowable expenses of the debtor.
II. THE DISPOSABLE INCOME REQUIREMENT
A. Income Requirements Pre-1984
Under the old Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,3 debtors
were not required to commit a specific portion of their income to
payments under a Chapter 13 plan. However, the courts retained
a general power of supervision over the future earnings of the
debtor during the period of the plan." The same was the case
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (1978 Act).5 The 1978
Act contained no explicit disposable income requirement. The
1978 Act merely transferred the general power of supervision
over the future income of the debtor from the court to the Trustee.' Consumer reorganization cases under the 1978 Act did not
require a debtor to pay general unsecured creditors any more
than they would have received under a liquidation in Chapter
77

Furthermore, payments to unsecured creditors under the
1978 Act bore no relationship to the debtor's income or the
amount of individual unsecured debts. Neither the debtor's projected nor actual income was considered as a criterion in the
confirmation process. No requirement existed as to the portion of
a debtor's income which had to be committed to payments under
the plan.8 Payments to the unsecured class of creditors were

3. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
4. The pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act provided that a plan "shall provide provisions
for the submission of future earnings or wages of the debtor to the supervision of
the court for the purposes of enforcing the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4) (1976).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
6. The Code states that a Chapter 13 plan shall "provide for the submission of
all or such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor to the
supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan."
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1994).
7. The requirement that Chapter 13 debtors pay creditors at least as much as
they would have received if the debtors had filed under Chapter 7 is commonly
known as the "best interests of the creditors" test, which appears at 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(4) (1994).
8. See, Bruce E. Kosub & Susan K. Thompson, The Religious Debtor's Conviction To Tithe as the Price of a Chapter 13 Discharge, 66 TEx. L. REV. 873, 876
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either dictated in terms of a minimum percentage to be paid to
the class of unsecured creditors or by specific payment schemes
which provided for exact payments to some creditors. The debtor
often scheduled payments to the class of unsecured creditors
without examining the claims filed by unsecured creditors or
being aware of the total amount of claims filed.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the interests of
unsecured creditors were often neglected under the 1978 Act.
Creditors had no way of accessing additional income which the
debtor received over and above his regular monthly expenses.
That was true for the periods before and after confirmation.
Under this system, the debtor's motivation to pay any more than
necessary to meet the best-interests-of-creditors test was purely
voluntary.
B. Court Ordered Income Requirements Pre-1984
Prior to the addition of the 1984 amendments, courts had
begun to shift from an approach based on minimum percentage
payment requirements to one making confirmation contingent
upon a debtor's ability to make payments based on household
income and expenses Courts began to reason that the "good
faith" confirmation requirement obliged debtors to make at least
some payment to their unsecured creditors under a Chapter 13
plan."0 Those courts attempted to impose some kind of a minimum payments rule on Chapter 13 debtors."
However, courts split with respect to whether Chapter 13
plans which did not commit payments to the unsecured class met
the good faith requirements. 2 Many courts required varying
(1988).
9. 5 COLLIERS ON BANKRuPTcy, 9 1325.01, at 1325-1 to 1325-55, (Lawrence P.
King, ed., 15th ed., 1993).
10. The good faith requirement appears at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(3) (1994).
11. In re Barnes, 13 B.R. 997, 999-1000 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981); In re Thebeau, 3
B.R. 538, 539 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
12. Tenny v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634, 635 (8th Cir. 1980); Ravenport
v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982); Lawrence Tractor Co.
v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 1983) (confirming a plan
providing for nominal payment). This was further complicated by variations in application of the good faith test. Compare In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337, 341 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1980 (using an objective test and finding that the "best effort" of the debtor was
not enough to fulfill the good faith requirement where repayment to the creditors
was only one percent) with Ravenot v. Rumgale, 669 F.2d 426, 432 (Bankr. 7th Cir.
1982) (remanding for application of a subjective test in which bankruptcy court must
evaluate whether "proposed payments indicate 'a fundamental fairness in dealing
with one's creditors').

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/8
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percentages to be paid to the unsecured class, even though such
payment may not have been necessary for the debtor to meet the
best interests of creditors test. 3 Some debtors, seeking to circumvent these distribution requirements, would propose plans to
pay one percent of the claims in the unsecured class.
The 1978 Act introduced the "feasibility test"14 and the
"best interests of creditors test"5 under the same section as the
good faith confirmation requirement. 6 Some courts relied only
on those two tests when examining payments committed under
the Chapter 13 plan. 7 Those courts would confirm a plan if the
debtor demonstrated that the payments could be made and that
the unsecured creditors would receive at least as much as they
would have received if the debtor had filed a Chapter 7 petition. 8 Thus, such courts took no account of the debtor's income
and measured only whether the debtor could afford to pay, or
whether the creditors would receive at least as much as they
would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation. Where the
debtors planned to pay their creditors at least as much as they
would have received under Chapter 7, the plans were often confirmed without further scrutiny. 9

13. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
14. The feasibility test states: "Except as provided in subsection (b), the court
shall confirm a plan if the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan
and to comply with the plan." Public L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2649 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX6)).
15. The best interests of the creditors test states:
Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if the
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than
the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor
were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2649 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)).
16. Under the old chapter XIII, creditors were entitled to vote on a plan under
11 U.S.C § 1056(a)(4). Fearing that this would vest so much power in the creditors
that debtors would avoid chapter XIII, Congress enacted the feasibility test to replace
it. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-24 (1977).
17. In re Hines, 7 B.R. 415 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1980); In re Perskin, 9 B.R. 626,
633 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981); In re Anderson, 18 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982).
18. In re Wolf, 22 B.R. 510, 513 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); In re Garcia, 6 B.R.
35, 37 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
19.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994); In re Wolf, 22 B.R. 510, 513 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982).
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C. Legislative Responses Pre-1984
Prior to the 1984 Amendments, Congress too had begun to
look at ways in which a Chapter 13 debtor could be compelled to
commit income for the benefit of creditors. In 1980, Congress
passed legislation which would have amended Chapter 13 to add
a "good faith effort" confirmation requirement.20 Two years later, Congress considered legislation which prohibited a debtor
from filing a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy if he could pay a reasonable
portion of his debts.21
In 1980, the Senate passed a bill which would have added a
confirmation requirement that the plan represent "the debtor's
bona fide effort."22 Two years later, the Senate considered a bill
which eliminated a debtor from Chapter 7 eligibility if he could
pay a portion of his pre-petition debts out of projected future income.23 Such a proposal would have enabled the courts to apply
a mechanical test at the time of confirmation. The Senate report
indicated that repayment of 75% of the nonmortgage debt would
be a reasonable portion and 25% would be considered unreasonable. The Bankruptcy Court could determine what amount was
reasonable for a debtor to repay between 25% and 75%."4 Senate Bill 2000 failed to pass and was reintroduced in the 98th
Congress.25 Later, the projected future income test was replaced
with the substantial abuse test under Chapter 7.2
D. Changes Under BAFJA
The 1984 amendments to the code added the disposable
income requirement as a condition for confirmation of a debtor's
proposed Chapter 13 plan. The disposable income requirement
was added at Section 1325(b) of the Code, which provides:
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the Court may not
approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan (A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan

20.
S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b) (1980).
21.
S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
22.
S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 128(b) (1980).
23. Id.
24.
For a more complete discussion of the Bills, see Irving A. Breitowitz, New
Developments In Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7 Dismissal On The Basis Of "Substantial Abuse", 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 330-336 (1985).
25.
S. 445 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
26. Id.
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on account of such claim is not less than the amount of such
claim; or (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan
will be applied to make payments under the plan."
The disposable income requirement arises in cases in which
unsecured creditors may be discharged without receiving payment of 100% of their allowed claim.2 8 The disposable income
requirement provides that, in the face of an objection by an unsecured creditor or the Trustee, the debtor must propose a plan
which commits 100% of his projected disposable income to payments under the plan.' Disposable income is defined in the
Code as:
[Income which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended (A) for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and (B) if
the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the
continuation, preservation, and opera30
tion of such business.
Thus, in the event that creditors were not being paid in full,
Congress authorized the courts to measure a debtor's ability to
pay when confirming a Chapter 13 plan.3 ' Under the provision,
the court may not confn-rm the plan in the face of an objection
from the Trustee or a creditor. Presumably no objection would be
raised by the Trustee or a creditor when a plan paid 100% of all
unsecured claims.32
It was noted that the disposable income test, if invoked by
unsecured creditors or the Trustee, should serve as the standard
for determining whether the debtor is reasonably capable of
paying more than originally proposed.' Complimenting the dis-

27. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
28. The applicable statute for allowance of claims provides that "[a] claim or
interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed,
unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership
that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)
(1994).
29. In re Reyes, 106 B.R. 155 (Bankr. N.D. l. 1989).
30.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1994).
31. In re Ashton, 85 B.R. 766, 768 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
32.
The courts have made clear that 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)1(B) (1994) requires
denial of confirmation of a 100% plan that omits to pay interest on unsecured claims
where the plan does not provide that all of the debtor's disposable income be applied
to making payments under the plan for three years.
33.
Oversight Hearings before the Subcomm. of Monopolies and Commercial law
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posable income requirement was the "substantial abuse" provision under Chapter 7." That provision allows the court to dismiss a case when it appears that a consumer debtor has committed substantial abuse. 35 It is substantial abuse of the bankrupt-

cy process when a consumer debtor is able to fund a Chapter 13
plan and has some ability to repay his creditors, but instead
seeks the benefit of a discharge under Chapter 7.36
E. The 1986 Act
The 1986 Act substituted the word "and" for "or" at the end
of Section 1325(b)(2)(A). 3 1 With that minor amendment, Congress indicated that the disposable income requirement should
not exclude the debtor who is engaged in business as a sole proprietor. The provision recognizes that a debtor engaged in business will need to pay the operating expenses of the business and
that the operating expenses should be considered when calculating projected disposable income. Thus, the change allows a debtor engaged in business to incur expenses while operating that
business and still meet the disposable income requirement.
III. FUNDING A CHAPTER 13 PLAN
Under BAFJA, the debtor's decision to file the case under
Chapter 13 instead of under Chapter 7 remains voluntary. Yet
debtors with incomes adequate enough to fund Chapter 13 plans
often fail to recognize the substantial benefits and protections
Chapter 13 offers over Chapter 7. For example, certain debts
which are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 are dischargeable in
Chapter 13. Other advantages are that the Chapter 13 debtor

of the House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 213 (1981-1982).
34. The Code provides in pertinent part:
After notice and hearing, the Court, on its own motion or on a motion by
the United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any
party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under
this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this
chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
36. Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A) (1994) (providing for the maintenance or support
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1994).
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has an absolute right to dismiss the case 9 and has the ability
to strip down and restructure certain secured debts,' classify
debts4 ' and retain non-exempt property. 42
A. Income and Property of the Estate
Property of the bankruptcy estate is defined at Section 541
of the Bankruptcy Code and includes all legal and equitable
interests of the debtor at the commencement of the case.' Congress expanded the definition of property of the estate for individuals involved in Chapter 13 cases by the enactment of Section
1306 of the Code. That section broadens the definition of property of the estate to include earnings from services performed by
the Chapter 13 debtor after the commencement of the case, but

39.
11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1994).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1994) & 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX1) (1994).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994).
43. The code defines property of the estate as follows:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as of the commencement of the case that is(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the
debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's
spouse, to the extent that such interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b),
363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if
such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of
the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire
within 180 days after such date(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse,
or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the
estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
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before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted." Section 1306
represents an expansion of the class of eligible debtors from the
former Chapter XIII to include debtors whose income is from
exempt sources.45
In enacting section 1306, Congress correctly recognized that
consumer debtors include a class of petitioners who receive income from sources other than employment or services performed.
Retirees, health and welfare benefit recipients, devisees, and
others may qualify as "individuals with regular income" for purposes of qualifying for eligibility under Chapter 13."
Congress recognized that debtors should be entitled to fund
a Chapter 13 plan with pensions and social security income and
that such benefits could not be used to fund a consumer reorganization plan if they were not property of the estate.4 7 The Senate report for the Bankruptcy Code noted that Chapter 13 of the
old Bankruptcy Act was defective because it did not permit some
individuals with regular income from sources such as social security and pensions to qualify because their incomes did not come
from "wages, salaries or commissions."' Both Senate and House
reports indicated that individuals with pension, social security or
investment incomes should be able to work out payment plans
with their creditors rather than seeking discharge under Chapter
749

Courts acknowledged that the purpose of the revision was to
make social welfare recipients eligible for Chapter 13 relief.5"
44. The Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in
section 541 of this title(1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed,
dismissed, or converted to a case under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title,
whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement
of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case
under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first.
(b) Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the
debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994).
45. United States v. Devall, 704 F.2d 1513, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1983).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1994).
47. S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CALN.
5787, 5798.
48. S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra note 47, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5799.
49. S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra note 47, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5810;
H. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 312, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6269.
50. See, e.g., Toson v. United States, 18 B.R. 371, 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
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However, courts acknowledged that the revision gave them no
authority to order the Social Security Administration to pay over
benefits to the Bankruptcy Trustee.51 But social security benefits can be used to fund a Chapter 13 debtor's plan if the debtor
proposes such a plan.52 The anti-assignment provisions of the
1984 Act prohibited the involuntary assignments of social security benefits." Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court cannot order the
transfer of social security benefits directly to the Trustee, but the
debtor may voluntarily submit to such an order."
Property of the estate also includes post-petition income,
whether from exempt sources or not, and is correctly applied to
fund a Chapter 13 plan.55 By making post-petition income property of the bankruptcy estate, Congress ensured that certain
income would not be put beyond the reach of the disposable
income requirement. Congress made clear that income received
by a debtor after the filing of the petition, whatever its source,
may be considered as property of the estate, used to fund a
Chapter 13 plan, and applied to meet the disposable income
requirement.'M In sum, the 1984 Amendments significantly expanded the availability of Chapter 13 and offered new advantages to both creditors and debtors in Chapter 13 relief.
B. An Individual With Regular Income
The Code provides certain eligibility requirements for Chapter 13 relief.57 To be eligible for Chapter 13 relief, the debtor
51. Devall, 704 F.2d at 1516 (holding a debtor may voluntarily fund a plan
with social security income).
52. The debtor is the only party that may propose a plan at the commencement
of a case. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
53. The legislative history of the act indicates that the anti-assignment provisions would remain intact. "Your committee's bill specifically provides that social
security and SSI benefits may not be assigned notwithstanding any other provision of
law, including P.L. 95-598, The 'Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978." H.R. Rep. No. 9825, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-83, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 219, 302; see also H.
Rep. No. 98-47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 153, reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.AN. 493.
54. But see In re Greene, 27 B.R. 462 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
55. In re Hagel, 13 Mont. B.R. 377 (1994), affd, 184 B.R. 793, 797 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1995).
56. Devall, 704 F.2d at 1513.
57. The Code provides in pertinent part:
Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing
of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than
$250,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $750,000,
or an individual with regular income and such individual's spouse, except a
stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of
the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less
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must demonstrate that he is an individual with regular income.58 As one court recognized:
Obviously, the thrust of the Chapter 13 revision was to make
its provision available to a range of persons wider than the
prior law. Expansion of the class to whom Chapter 13 is available comports with the basic legislative goal: to encourage financially overextended individual debtors to make greater use
of voluntary repayment plans and thereby improve debtor relief, by allowing ratable distribution of future income without
necessarily liquidating their non-exempt assets, and creditor
recovery, by guaranteeing repayment of most, if not all, of the
claims over an extended period.59
Without a source of regular income from employment or some
other source, the debtor will be unable to fund a Chapter 13
reorganization plan. It follows that the regular income requirement was imposed for eligibility purposes.

C. Disposable Income Is Based on Income from All Sources
1. Income from Exempt Sources
All of the debtor's income is to be included in the calculations of projected disposable income. Nontaxable income, such as
personal injury damages," government benefits" and
inheritances6 2 have been determined to justify modification to
reflect increased disposable income.' The court In re Schnabel
recognized:
As Judge Lundin noted, §1325(b) does not qualify income by
reference to its exempt status. Where there is no express limitation in the text, the Debtor bears an "exceptionally heavy"
burden of persuading the Court that Congress intended one. In
than $250,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$750,000 may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.

11 U.S.C. §109(e) (1994).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1994) (defining an individual with regular income as
an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a
stockbroker or a commodity broker").
59. In re Hughes, 7 B.R. 791, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (quoting In re
Buren, 6 B.R. 744 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980)).
60. In re Tomasso, 98 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
61. In re Kloberdanz, 83 B.R. 767, 772 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
62. In re Euerle, 70 B.R. 72, 73 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987).
63. See also Agribank, FCB v. Honey (In re Honey), 167 B.R. 540 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994).
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Patterson, the Supreme Court considered whether "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" in §541(c)(2) referred only to state law.
The Court found that "[t]he text contains no limitation on 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' relating to the source of the law"
and refused to impose one. Similarly, without an express or
even implicit limitation in §1325(b)(2) on "income" relating to
its exempt status, this Court will not impose one. The Debtor's
social security and pension payments are "income[ ] received by
the debtor," and, to the extent not reasonably necessary for
support,
must be devoted to the repayment of unsecured cred4
itors.6
The Schnabel Court correctly ruled that exempt income
contributes to disposable income to be paid under the Chapter 13
plan. 65 Debtors should be required to commit exempt income to
payment of reasonable living expenses prior to committing income from nonexempt sources to the payment of such expenses.
The disposable income requirement does not exclude income
from exempt sources."
Where a portion of the household income was derived from
exempt sources (social security income), the debtors would be
required to spend the exempt income on the expenses which
were reasonably necessary for the maintenance of their household prior to any other expenses. 67 Thus, the debtors would be
left with the nonexempt income for full funding of the plan and
meeting the disposable income requirement. One court recognized that to allow debtors to retain exempt income without committing it to payments under the Chapter 13 plan thwarts the
legislative intent of Chapter 13." Recognizing that Chapter 13
offers the benefits of a broader discharge than one under Chapter 7,69 the court found that consumer lenders should be able to
64. In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809, 815-16 (N.D. MI. 1993) (citations omitted).
65. See also In re Jackson, 173 B.R. 168 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (workers' compensation benefits); Hagel v. Drummond (In re Hagel), 171 B.R. 686 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1994), affd., 184 B.R. 793 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995) (social security disability
benefits); In re Rogers, 168 B.R. 806 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993) (U.S. Navy retirement
benefits); Watters v. McRoberts, 167 B.R. 146 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994) (personal injury
recovery); Solomon v. Cosby (In re Solomon), 166 B.R. 832 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994) (exempt Individual Retirement Account), rev'd, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995); In re
Morse, 164 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994) (social security benefits, U.S. Army
pension, and National Guard pension); In re Minor, 177 B.R. 576 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1995) (workers' compensation benefits).

66.

Hagel, 184 B.R. at 796.

67. Id. at 796.
68. In re Minor, 177 B.R. at 580 (quoting In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809, 818
(Bankr. N.D. IlI. 1993)).
69. The discharge allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994) differs substantially
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look to the debtor's exempt income for the repayment of consumer loans as a quid pro quo for the broader discharge provisions of
Chapter 13.70
Issues have arisen at the time of confrmation regarding
whether income from exempt sources is property of the estate.
The definition of "property of the estate" is different from the
definition of "disposable income." An estate in bankruptcy consists of all the interests in property, legal and equitable, possessed by the debtor at the time of filing and the income the
debtor receives before the case is closed.7 "An exemption is an
interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor."72 The property which may be
exempted must first become property of the estate.73 Property of
the estate includes virtually all of the debtor's property, while
disposable income includes only that income not necessary for
the maintenance of the debtor or dependents of the debtor. 74
Thus, the debtor may support himself with exempt income,
which is property of the estate, thereby leaving non-exempt income available to fund a Chapter 13 plan.
2. Disposable Income Is Distinct from Taxable Income
Disposable income is unrelated to income from a taxable
income approach. Courts have held that the definition of "income" for the purpose of computing disposable income "is not
necessarily calculated or premised on a strict Tax Code approach ... ,7'The calculation of disposable income differs from
the Tax Code approach because it relates to both the debtor's
income and expenses. 76 Also, the debtor's spouse's income contributes to the maintenance of the household and therefore must
be included in the disposable income calculation." An increase
in the debtor's income prior to confirmation could effect dispos-

from the discharge offered to debtors under 11 U.S.C. § 1327 (1994). See supra text
accompanying notes 38-42.
70. In re Minor, 177 B.R. at 580 (quoting In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. at 817).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994); 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1994).
72. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308 (1991).

73.

Id.

74.
11 U.S.C. § 1306; 11 U.S.C. § 541; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(bX2) (1994).
75. In Re Gage, 159 B.R. 272, 281 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1993); accord In Re Martin,
130 B.R. 951, 965-66 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991).
76. In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 718 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
77. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 563 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Saunders, 60
B.R. 187, 188 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Metzger, 11 Mont. B.R. 199, 208-09
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/8

14

Drummond: Disposable Income Requirements under Chapter 13

1996]

DISPOSABLE INCOME REQUIREMENTS

437

able income, but only if there is no change in the debtor's related
expenses.7"
IV. DETERMINING COMPOSITION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME
A. Actual Versus ProjectedDisposable Income
Although the statute clearly refers to "projected" disposable
income, courts are split as to whether the projected disposable
income requirement under Chapter 13 should be based on "actual" disposable income or "projected" disposable income. Commentators have recognized that the calculation of projected disposable income may be difficult, if not impossible. For example,
Collier states:
To some extent this task is, of course, impossible. The court has
no way of knowing whether debtors will continue to work at
their current incomes, or whether they will be laid off or become disabled or suffer other diminutions of income. The court
does not know whether the debtor will live for three years.79
The disposable income issue becomes complicated when determining whether the court must project disposable income or rely
on actual income figures. In Rowley v. Yarnall, ° the Eighth Circuit determined that a Chapter 12 debtor must commit all actual
disposable income in order to meet the disposable income test.8"
The Rowley court reasoned that in a Chapter 12 case "projected
disposable income" means the net disposable income actually received by the debtors during the plan period. The court stated:
We hold that section 1225(b)(1)(B) imposes a duty on debtors to
include a provision in their reorganization plan that promises
payment of net disposable income received during the plan
period to unsecured creditors in the event that the Trustee or
holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation of

78. In re Dunning, 157 B.R. 51 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1993).
79. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, § 1325.08, at 1325-67 (Lawrence P. King, ed.,
15th ed. 1995).
80. 22 F.3d 190 (8th Cir. 1994).
81. Chapter 12 includes a disposable income requirement identical to that appearing under Chapter 13:
[Tihe plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income to
be received in the three-year period, or such longer period as the court may
approve under section 1222(c), beginning on the date that the first payment
is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (1994).
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the plan.82
In In re Anderson,' however, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals correctly determined that projected disposable income is
the income that the debtor projects he will receive at the time of
confirmation of the plan.8 The Anderson court held that actual
disposable income can only be paid after a Trustee or party in
interest requests and obtains an order for modification of a
Chapter 13 debtor's plan.' Only after a court-approved modification of the plan would any increased disposable income of the
debtor have to be paid over to the Trustee.86
In Anderson, the Trustee requested that the debtors sign a
"best effort certification" which would constitute an agreement
by the debtors to pay all actual disposable income to the Trustee. 7 The Trustee would review the actual income on a periodic
basis and adjust their payments without further order of the
court, according to his determination of their annual income.'
The Andersons refused to sign the certification, and the bankruptcy court denied confirmation of their Chapter 13 plan. 9 The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying
confirmation. 0

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined

that Section 1325(b)(1)(B) requires "payment of all projected
disposable income" as calculated at the time of confirmation and
rejected the Trustee's attempt to impose a more burdensome
requirement.9 1 The court suggested that, in the event the
debtor's disposable income increases, the Trustee may request
modification of a plan.92 Thereupon, the Trustee has the burden
of showing a substantial change in the debtor's ability to pay
since the confirmation hearing.9 3 The Trustee must also show
that the prospect of the change had not been taken into account
at the time of confirmation.94 The court recognized that, by pro-

viding the Section 1329 mechanism to modify a confirmed plan,

82.
83.
84.

Rowley, 22 F.3d at 193.
21 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 358.

85.
86.

Id.
Id.

87.

Anderson, 21 F.3d at 356-57.

88.

Id.

89.

Anderson, 21 F.3d at 357.

90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.

93.
94.

Anderson, 21 F.3d at 358.
Id. at 357.
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Congress plainly did not vest Trustees with unfettered authority
to adjust
payments under the terms of the confirmed Chapter 13
95
plan.
In view of Anderson, it appears that the Trustee must monitor debtors' actual income in order to make a determination
about whether to seek a modification under Section 1329. Implementing such a requirement would be extremely burdensome on
the Trustee. The Trustee would be required to monitor actual
income figures for thousands of debtors, a task which would
render the Trustee's duties impractical and uneconomical.
Other courts have taken a middle course and attempted to
impose a fixed percentage of changes in income to be paid under
the terms of the plan.96 Such treatment may be questionable
when the projected disposable income cannot be calculated. Yet,
such a requirement appears to anticipate future changes in the
debtor's income. In view of the fact that Congress provided for
changes in disposable income by providing a mechanism for
modification of a confirmed plan, such treatment may lack fairness and practicality. Changes in projected disposable income
generally cannot accurately be calculated for a period of years
into the future. Debtors may anticipate such changes, but generally cannot be certain that they will occur. Debtors should not be
expected to guarantee such changes. And, as noted, the Trustee
may propose a modification if changes occur in the debtor's disposable income.
B. CalculatingProjected Disposable Income
The disposable income requirement is correctly limited to
"projected" disposable income. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized:
The language of the statute is clear. If the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim or trustee objects to the confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan and the plan proposes less than full payment
of a creditor's claim, the plan may be approved only if "as of the
effective date of the plan", it provides for payment of "all of the
debtor's projected disposable income to be received in a three
year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due
under the plan...." The Fifth Circuit, in Matter of Killough,
described the two-part process for arriving at... [the] "project95. Id. at 358.
96. In re Akin, 54 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985); In re Krull, 54 B.R. 375,
378 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
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ed disposable income" figure. "For practical purposes, this task
is usually accomplished by multiplying the debtor's monthly
income by 36. Next, the Bankruptcy Court must assess the
amount of the debtor's income that is 'disposable'. 7
Projected disposable income is usually calculated by multiplying
the debtor's monthly income by the number of months in the
plan.9 8 From this amount, the debtor's expenses are subtracted.99 As seen above, unanticipated increases in disposable income may constitute a change in circumstances warranting modification of the plan."° The Trustee may then seek to modify
the plan in order to increase plan payments based on the
debtor's increased disposable income.' ° ' The debtor has a duty
to report interests acquired in property after the petition."
Furthermore, the debtor has a duty to cooperate with the Trustee and must transfer books and records to the Trustee. 0 3 Thus,
the Trustee has a means to monitor and propose modified plans
according to changes in the debtor's disposable income. However,
the Trustee lacks the authority to alter the amount of a debtor's
payments unilaterally."c

97. Anderson, 21 F.3d at 357 (internal citations ommitted).
98. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c) (1994).
99. Anderson, 21 F.3d at 358.
100. Id. The Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of
payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the
debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular
class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take account of any payment
of such claim other than under the plan..
(b)(1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this section.
(b)(2) The plan as modified becomes the plan unless, after notice and a
hearing, such modification is disapproved.
(c) A plan modified under this section may not provide for payments over a
period that expires after three years after the time that the first payment
under the original confirmed plan was due, unless the court, for cause,
approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that
expires after five years after such time.
11 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994).
101. Anderson, 21 F.3d at 358 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994)).
102.
FED. RuLE BANxR. PRoc. 1007(h) (1996).
103.
11 U.S.C. § 521(4) (1994).
104. The Code provides that the confirmed plan is binding on the debtor and

each creditor:
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In calculating disposable income, courts have mistakenly
distinguished between income from exempt sources and income
from the proceeds of an exempt asset.105 In this regard, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit recently confirmed that the disposable income requirement does not distinguish between types of income.1l 1 The court correctly held that
social security income, although exempt, should be included in
disposable income and used to fund a plan. °7 Nonetheless, the
Panel erroneously noted a distinction between funding a plan
with an exempt stream of income-such as social security income-and funding a plan with the sale or liquidation of an
exempt asset-such as a personal injury claim."° Such reasoning fails to recognize that liquidation of exempt assets can also
generate additional disposable income for the purposes of funding a plan."° Also, the debtors' ability to claim an exemption is
independent from their ability to repay debts."0 In sum, the
source of income is irrelevant to the calculation of disposable income and courts should include income from the proceeds of
exempt assets in that calcualation.
V. DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DEBTOR'S
EXPENSES

(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor,
whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and
whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected
the plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the
plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in
the debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the
plan, the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section
is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the
plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1327 (1994).
105. In re Tomasso, 98 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989).
106. In re Hagel, 184 B.R. 793 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 799.
108. Id. at 797 n.3.
109. The applicable statute does not distinguish between income from exempt
sources and income from the liquidation of exempt assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325
(bX 1)(B).
110. In re Morse, 164 B.R. 651, 656 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994); In re Cenis, 13
Mont. B.R. 336, 338 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
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A. Expenses Necessary for Maintenance of the Household
When determining disposable income, problems arise in
projecting a debtor's expenses similar to those that arise in projecting income. The court is likewise called upon to speculate
about the debtor's living and business expenses over the term of
the plan. Collier notes that "[s]uch a projection would require the
Court to guess whether the debtor would have additional children, unexpected marital separations, medical bills, home repairs, or a wide variety of other future medical expenses. Obviously, this is impossible."' Nonetheless, courts are called upon
to determine which expenses are necessary, and generally do so
based upon the debtor's best estimates. The courts have applied
two tests to determine which income and expenses are reasonably necessary for maintenance in support of the household-the
"good-faith" test and the "reasonably necessary" test.
1. The Good Faith Test
Some courts have applied a "good faith" test to measure
what is reasonably necessary for maintenance in support of the
debtor. The good faith inquiry is applicable to the good faith
requirement necessary for continuation under section 1325(a)(6)
of the Code. However, courts have confused the good faith requirement with the disposable income requirement. Such confusion probably arises from case law written before the disposable
income requirement was enacted. In fact, the good faith inquiry
is much broader than the disposable income requirement.
In making a good faith inquiry, the court may look to numerous factors."' For example, the court in In re
Humphrey"' held "that as long as the debtors are using all of
their disposal income to fund the plan section 1325(b)(1)(B) is
satisfied . ..
4 That court reasoned that the propriety of the
debt or expenses incurred by the debtor is to "be analyzed within
the confines of the good faith standard of section 1325(a)(3).""'
The Humphrey court implied, therefore, that so long as the debtor is spending all of his income and not committing a portion of

111.
ed., 15th
112.
113.
114.
115.

5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy
1325.08, at 1325-68 to -69 (Lawrence P. King
ed. 1995).
Goeb v. Heid (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1992).
165 B.R. 508 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
Humphrey, 165 B.R. at 510.
Id. (implying some interaction between the disposable income requirements

and the good faith test).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/8

20

Drummond: Disposable Income Requirements under Chapter 13

1996]

DISPOSABLE INCOME REQUIREMENTS

443

his income to savings, he is using all of his disposable income
and meets the disposable income test. Thus, the good faith test
may fail to measure whether a particular category of expense is
reasonably necessary for maintenance of the debtor or dependents of the debtor. In effect, the good faith approach assumes
that all of the debtor's expenses are reasonable."
2. The Reasonably Necessary Test
Other courts have correctly recognized that any decision as
to whether a particular expense is reasonable depends upon the
specific circumstances of the debtor and is best left to the sound
discretion of the judge." 7 Some courts have determined that
various expenses are not acceptable and that the disposable
income test is not met where debtors are committing a portion of
their income to expenses which they deem to be unreasonable or
unnecessary.'
These courts correctly recognize that the good
faith requirement for confirmation is a separate inquiry from the
disposable income requirement. Each debtor's circumstances are
unique and the court should be allowed to make a case by case
determination that certain expenses are reasonable. The disposable income test is not contingent on the good faith test. The
confusion between the two standards results from those pre-1984
cases in which courts had no other standard to rely on than the
good faith standard.
The "reasonably necessary" test at section 1325(b) of the
Code only applies to recurring expenses for food, clothing and
shelter that are paid directly by the debtor."' The reasonably
necessary test does not apply to obligations that a debtor is attempting to repay through the plan.' ° Automobile payments
made by the Trustee as part of payments under the debtor's plan
are not considered disposable income.' On the other hand,

116.
This fails to recognize that the Court should inquire into the reasonableness
of the expense.
117.
In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604, 607-09 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (finding
educational expenses discretionary and unnecessary).
118. In re Goewey, 185 B.R. 144 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re Vazquez, 111
B.R. 19 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1990).
119. In re Jones, 119 B.R. 996, 1000 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990).
120. This reasoning fails to recognize those instances where a debtor is not paying unsecured claims in full, yet, seeks to pay for luxury items or unnecessary expenses through the plan.
121. But see In re Lindsey, 122 B.R. 157, 158 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding
that making payments for the financial benefit of the debtor through the Chapter 13
Trustee rather than directly by the debtor is not a reason to exclude payments from
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payments for "recreation home maintenance, clothing and personal grooming" may detract from disposable income. 122 In
short, any inclusion in the plan of generous sums for unnecessary expenses shows an unwillingness on the debtor's part to
12
modify his lifestyle in order to satisfy his obligations.
B. A Spending Cushion
Miscellaneous expenses are left to the discretion of the
court."2 The Bankruptcy Court should not "inject itself' in the
debtor's "personal choices" of expenditures of household expenses. 5 Nor should the debtor's standard of living be altered by
the court. On the other hand, the disposable income requirement
may call for sacrifice on the debtor's part if it was the debtor's
lifestyle that caused him to seek bankruptcy relief."
However, courts are reluctant to dictate the lifestyle of the
debtor. The court should not interfere with such matters as entertainment, movies, cable television, music lessons, sports
leagues, health clubs, and education support for children, so long
as the court can determine that the expenses are reasonably
necessary for the maintenance of the household. 127 To the extent that the debtor is spending his income on items that are
frivolous, or that are not necessary for the maintenance of the
household, the court should not hesitate to deny confirmation
based on the disposable income requirement. 2 '
However, the courts may allow a general cushion in expenses.2 9 Many debtors wish to propose spending for "miscellaneous" expenses which are not included in any other category of

the reasonable necessity test of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1994)).
122. In re Whitelock, 122 B.R. 582, 593 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990).
123. Whitelock, 122 B.R. at 593.
124. In re Anderson, 143 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992) (discussing how
"Chapter 13 debtors should be permitted to budget a reasonable amount for miscellaneous discretionary" expenses).
125. Anderson, 143 B.R. at 721.
126. In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 157 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
127. See, e.g., In re Riegodedios, 146 B.R. 691 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) ('All disposable income' does not mean debtor's prison . .
").
128. In re Farmer, 186 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1995) (relying upon the
good faith requirement to deny confirmation where a debtor planned to pay nothing
to the unsecured creditors and failed to explain a spending cushion of $150.00 per
month).
129. In re Rybicki, 138 B.R. 225, 228 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992); In re Crompton, 73
B.R. 800, 809 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676, 683 n.7 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1986); In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 552-53 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); In re Otero, 48

B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
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expenses in the debtor's schedules. The cushion depends upon
the amount of the debtor's other household expenses.13 The
debtor's cushion may include his spending in categories of discretionary expenses such as recreation, clothing and entertainment.
The Montana Bankruptcy Court has reasoned that an excessive cushion may be the basis for denial of confirmation. 3 ' The
Trustee and creditors must recognize that the debtor cannot
project his expenses accurately for the entire length of the plan.
However, the debtor should not be allowed to build in a large
cushion based upon unknown future expenses.
C. Luxury Items
Some courts have denied confirmation of proposed Chapter
13 plans because the debtor wishes to retain some type of luxury
item. 32 This leaves the court in a quandary about how to define a luxury item."3 Specifically, courts have encountered difficulty in using a subjective versus an objective approach. What
may appear to be a luxury item for one debtor may be a necessity for another. Courts would find an objective approach impossible to administer because debtors' circumstances vary enormously. For example, the size of a debtor's home and the resulting mortgage payments, the type of vehicle owned by the debtor,
and the size of expense items for food, utilities, insurance, and
clothing all vary tremendously from case to case.
Yet the definition of a luxury item is closely aligned with the
definition of "disposable income." Courts have recognized the
danger that a debtor may be living a luxurious lifestyle at the
expense of the creditors whose claims are being discharged. For
example, courts have found that a boat is not necessary for the
maintenance of the debtor,' 34 and that retention of a second
home or additional mortgage payments are not reasonably neces-

130. In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1986) (holding that debtor must
eliminate some expenses but allowing a small cushion).
131. In re Marshall, 111 B.R. 325, 326-27 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (determining
that a cushion of $469.10 per month was excessive).
132. See, e.g., In re Webster, 165 B.R. 173, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
133. The Code provides little direction. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (1994)
(providing "luxury goods and services' do not include goods or services reasonably
acquired for the support or maintenance of the debtor").
134. In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); see also In re Cordes, 147
B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the good faith test prohibited the
debtors from making direct payments for a boat while paying unsecured creditors
only 46% of their claims).
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sary.'" These findings preclude confirmation because such unnecessary expenses violate both the disposable income test and
the prohibition on unreasonable discrimination among creditors
in a class.'36
Other courts have employed a more subjective approach to
the reasonably necessary test by looking at each individual
debtor's circumstances to determine what is "reasonably necessary" for the maintenance of the debtor's household. Such courts
have generally avoided requiring debtors to make drastic changes in their lifestyles." 7 A more subjective approach takes into
consideration the wide variation in debtors' needs and circumstances. It means that a court is more likely to show restraint in
changing or dictating a debtor's lifestyle when evaluating the
reasonableness of certain expenses.
The debtor, however, may seek to retain a particular luxury
item while living a generally frugal lifestyle. Essential activities
and expenses go beyond some bare minimum that the debtor
requires to live on. 3 ' For example, one debtor was allowed to
retain three vehicles, 39 while another was not allowed to retain and pay for a Corvette sports car when payments on a less
expensive automobile would be much lower."4 These cases reflect that circumstances differ from case to case: one debtor may
need several automobiles to provide transportation for several
members of his household, whereas another may not need a luxury car to meet transportation needs.
In sum, a debtor who uses post-petition income to pay for a
luxury vehicle or any other luxury item, whether directly or
through the Trustee, does not apply all of his disposable income
to payments to debts under the plan and does not meet the disposable income requirements.'" However, the courts are in
disagreement as to whether the debtor's payment of both prepetition debts and post-petition expenses deduct from the

135. In re Cardillo, 170 B.R. 490, 491 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).
136. In re Kasun, 186 B.R. 62, 64 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
137. In re Tinneberg, 59 B.R. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
138. See In re Gonzales, 157 B.R. 604 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993). There ought to
be some allocation for recreation, clubs, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, etc.
139. In re Marshall, 181 B.R. 599 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
140. In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); see also In re Reyes,
106 B.R. 155, 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (denying confirmation where debtor sought
to retain "extravagant 4-wheel drive vehicle"); In re Jones, 119 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1990) (denying confirmation where debtor sought to retain luxury car).
141. In re Gibson, 142 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (denying confirmation
when debtor retained luxury cars by paying for the cars through plan).
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debtor's disposable income.'" But any expenditure for a luxury
item effectively detracts from the debtor's disposable income.
Thus, the same standard should apply to pre- and post-petition
debts.
D. Maintenance and Support of Dependents of the Debtor
A dependent of the debtor may be any person who is reasonably dependent on the debtor for support." This definition is
not necessarily related to the definition of dependent for federal
tax purposes.'" Parents, children and relatives of the debtor
may be dependents." The age of the relative may be critical in
determining if the expense should be allowed." Also, a court
may distinguish between a moral and a legal duty to support a
particular relative. 147 Persons not related to the debtor may
face a more critical test of whether they are allowable dependents.'" Expenses related to allowable dependents may detract
from a debtor's disposable income. On the other hand, it is uncertain whether the income they contribute adds to disposable
income of the household. 9 Finally, it is unlikely that a court

142. In re Rybicki, 138 B.R. 225 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992); see also In re Lindsey,
122 B.R. 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991). Disposable income is affected by a debtor's
payment of a post-petition expense because the expense is included in the debtor's
list of budgeted expenses and subtracted from the debtor's gross income. 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b) (1994) does not explicitly distinguish between pre-petition debts and postpetition expenses.
143. In re Tracey, 66 B.R. 63, 66-67 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
144. Id.
145. Handeen v. LaMaire (In re LaMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1380-81 (8th Cir.
1989) (observing that the obligation to pay rent to parents is reasonably necessary
for the maintenance of the debtor).
146. In re Clements, 185 B.R. 903, 909 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that
debtor's 32 year old daughter, who was recovering alcoholic, was not a dependent for
the purposes of the disposable income requirement).
147. Id. at 909 (holding that debtor's adult sister who lived in a nursing home
and had cerebral palsy was not a dependent of debtor where debtor paid for private
nurses and other amenities not covered by medicare).
148. In re McKean, 81 B.R. 9, 11 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that co-tenant and co-tenant's daughter were not dependents of the debtor and declining to
"incorporate current social theory" regarding "novel living arrangements" into "current
legal theory").
149. Compare In re Edwards, 15 Mont. B.R. 182 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1996) (holding
that a debtor met the disposable income requirement where his spouse's income contributed to the payment of household expenses and allowed the debtor to contribute
additional income to the plan) with In re Metzger, 11 Mont. B.R. 199, 208 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1992) (holding that the proposed plan fails the disposable income requirement where debtor pays all family expenses while his spouse saves all of her
income).
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would allow expenses related to mere friends or roommates
when calculating disposable income. 5 '
E. Retirement Accounts
Two questions have arisen regarding retirement accounts.
First is the issue of whether a debtor may voluntarily fund a
retirement account and still meet the disposable income requirement.'51 Second is the issue of whether a debtor could be compelled to withdraw funds from his retirement accounts for purposes of funding his plan.'52
With respect to the first issue, a debtor does not meet the
disposable income requirement when he commits a portion of
earnings to fund a 401-K plan which was not required as a condition of employment.'53 Furthermore, voluntary contributions
to a pension fund are not necessary for maintenance or support
of the debtor,"54 and a debtor therefore may not voluntarily
commit funds to profit sharing or pension plans."5 These decisions indicate that a retirement account is not reasonably necessary for the maintenance and support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor-at least for the debtor who is not using those
funds for present day living expenses. Thus, the debtor who is
using present day disposable income to fund future living expenses may place himself in a position which precludes confirmation of his proposed plan. In addition, the debtor's repayment of
a loan from his retirement account detracts from his disposable
income. "

Regarding the second issue, the Fourth Circuit recently
determined that it was error for the bankruptcy court to include
some hypothetical amount of income from the debtor's individual
retirement account because the account was not relevant to the
disposable income requirement.'57 Thus, a debtor cannot be re150. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
151. In re Stones, 157 B.R. 669 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993); In re Cavanaugh, 175
B.R. 369 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994); In re Short, 176 B.R. 886 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995).
152. In re Short, 176 B.R. 886, 888 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995).
153. In re Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. 369, 373 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994).
154. In re Cavanaugh, 175 B.R. at 369; In re Stones, 157 B.R. 669, 671 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1993); In re Fountain, 142 B.R. 135, 137 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); In re
Scott, 142 B.R. 126, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
155. In re Festner, 54 B.R. 532, 533 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1985).
156. In re Delnero, 191 B.R. 539, 542 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
postpetition payroll deductions used to repay prepetition loans from debtor's retirement account had to be included in debtor's disposable income); In re Goewey, 185
B.R. 444, 446 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995).
157. In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995). The court ruled that the funds
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quired to withdraw funds from a retirement account for the purposes of funding a Chapter 13 plan.'58 Funds already held in
the retirement account do not add to the debtor's disposable
income and confirmation cannot be conditioned upon the withdrawal of pension or retirement income to fund the plan.
F. Tithing
Numerous courts have found that tithing is not reasonably
necessary for the maintenance of a household and is therefore
not an allowable expense.'59 Even though a debtor may deprive
himself of other expense items such as recreation, the debtor's
tithing may still detract from his disposable income-precluding
his proposed plan from confirmation. The debtor's other expenses
are unrelated to the necessity of the charitable contribution for
the maintenance of the debtor.
The Montana Bankruptcy Court adopted such reasoning in
the case of In Re Lees.5 0 In that case, the debtors' income exceeded their expenses by over $150 per month, but their expenses included a $200 per month tithe to the Shepherd of the Valley
Church.' 6 ' The court found that the tithe was not a reasonably
necessary expense, noting that to allow such charitable donations would compel creditors "to make defacto contributions" to
the benefitted charity. 2

held in the debtor's individual retirement accounts were only relevant "to the 'best
interests of creditors' prerequisite for confirmation of a chapter 13 plan." Id. at 1132
(noting that the retirement accounts in this case were exempt under Maryland law
and therefore unavailable to creditors in a Chapter 7 liquidation).
158. Id. at 1133.
159. See In re Miles, 96 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989); In re Reynolds, 83
B.R. 684 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1988); In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987);
In re Chrzanowski, 70 B.R. 447 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987); In re Green, 73 B.R. 893
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987), affd, 103 B.R. 852 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1988); In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. 82 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985); see also In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (finding a proposed monthly tithe of $540.00 excessive); In re
Packham, 126 B.R. 603 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991) (finding that 10% tithe is not reasonably necessary for maintenance and support of the debtor).
160. In re Lees, 14 Mont. B.R. 181, 192 B.R. 756 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
161. Id. at 757.
162. Id. at 759 (quoting In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 610 (Bankr. D. Utah
1991)). However, the debtor in In re Tessier, 15 Mont. B.R. 17, 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1995), challenged the Lees holding on the basis of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). The court recognized the inherent difficulties of resolving the
dispute between the debtor and the church over the moral necessity of tithing. However, the court found that it lacked the institutional capacity to balance the constitutionality presumed free exercise rights of the debtors against the interest of the government in burdening those rights. Because the court lacked the institutional capaci-
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Other courts have reasoned that a certain amount of discretionary spending is reasonable and that a Chapter 13 debtor
may include some charitable contribution as part of his discretionary expenses. 1" These courts seem to agree that the debtor
is entitled to some reasonable amount to pay as he sees fit. This
position, however, is not consistent with the definition of disposable income and fails to recognize that such contributions are
made at the expense of creditors who have already extended
credit to the debtor.
G. Life Insurance
Life insurance has been determined to detract from the
debtor's disposable income. In the case of In re Smith,' the
court determined that, absent a showing that life insurance was
required by law, life insurance premiums are not reasonably
necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtors, and had
to be included in the disposable income for purposes of confirmation. The court likened life insurance to retirement plans and
savings accounts and recognized that such accounts are means
by which debtors contribute present income to future income."
As such, life insurance is not a necessary expense.
H. Income Tax Refunds
Income tax refunds represent an over-withholding of taxes
from current income and increased income upon delivery of the
refund. Tax refunds are property of the bankruptcy estate."6
The Trustee must look at the amount of the debtor's tax deductions and whether the debtor anticipates a tax refund. If a
debtor's budget proposes excess withholding taxes, then the debtor is not committing all projected disposable income to the
plan. 167
ty to strike that constitutional balance, the court declared the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act unconstitutional. Id. at 406-07. Thus, RFRA did not affect the Lees
decision and charitable contributions would continue to be disallowed as a necessary
expense in the disposable income calculation. Id.
163. In re Tessier, 15 Mont. B.R. at 21, 190 B.R. at 399; see also In re Anderson, 143 B.R. 719 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992); In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1988); In re Wood, 92 B.R. 264 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Green, 73 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
164.
187 B.R. 678 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995).

165.

Id. at 679.

166.
167.

Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 462 (1974).
In re Rhein, 73 B.R. 285 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Red, 60 B.R. 113
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However, a distinction must be drawn between the mere
possibility of receiving a tax refund and a likely projected refund.
The Trustee cannot simply require submission of all future tax
refunds to the plan. If tax refunds are to be included in the plan,
the Trustee must demonstrate the debtor's potential for receiving
tax refunds during the plan period."8 Thus, debtors should only be entitled to retain refunds if they have correctly calculated
their disposable income by including any anticipated refund at
the time of confirmation.
VI. CONCLUSION

The disposable income requirement under Chapter 13 is a
major factor both in determining whether a plan meets the requirements for confirmation and in measuring the consumer
debtor's reorganization efforts. The disposable income requirement will become more important as a tool for creditors seeking
to maximize their distributions under Chapter 13 plans. It is not
surprising that Trustees and creditors alike are examining the
disposable income requirement more closely, seeking to exercise
their rights to modify the proposed plan as they become aware of
increased disposable income. Debtors must recognize that, in
exchange for the significant benefits offered by Chapter 13, they
must offer a reasonable portion of their income to their creditors.
Congress and the courts have correctly recognized that debtors
will find the benefits of a Chapter 13 reorgnaization worth the
cost of complying with the disposable income requirement.

(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986), overruled on other grounds by In re Minor, 177 B.R. 5786
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).
168. In re Heath, 182 B.R. 557 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995); In re Kuhen, 177 B.R.
671 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995).
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